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1. Introduction 
The displacement of agriculture as a dominant element of American society and the national 
economic landscape is among the most significant transitions of the past century (Jackson-Smith 
and Jensen 2009; Lobao and Meyer 2001).  Evidence of this decline includes the falling number 
of United States counties designated as farming dependent, the fact that fewer than two percent 
of Americans are now engaged in farming, and the large number of farms operating without a 
profit motive (so-called “lifestyle farms”) (Dimitri et al. 2005; Ghelfi and McGranahan 2004). 
However, it is the conversion of farmland to build infrastructure attendant to residential, 
commercial or industrial development that is the most visible manifestation of farm decline.  
These land use changes have elevated concern about the retention of agricultural lands, resulting 
in significant public investments in farmland preservation.  
Protection of the nation's farm sector has long been a federal policy objective, rationalized in 
part by the priority of maintaining domestic food production capacity and reflective of inherent 
value Americans place on rurality and the Jeffersonian ideal of small family farms (Danborn 
1996). Since the mid-1900s, urban expansion and the low-density, exurban growth pattern 
commonly identified as “sprawl” have joined the vagaries of market fluctuations, weather, pests 
and disease as a significant threat to farming in many parts of the nation (Rudel et al. 2011; 
Heimlich and Anderson 2001; Sorensen, et al. 1997; Daniels and Bowers 1997; Lopez et al. 
1988; Berry 1978).  Research in the late 1970s conducted as part of the National Agricultural 
Lands Study increased awareness of the pressures on the nation's agricultural resources and 
concerns over the loss of farmland to development.  The rate of land conversion to developed 
uses has been exceeding the rate of population growth and one-third of the total developed land 
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area in the continental United States (approximately 40 million acres) was developed between 
1982 and 2007 (USDA 2009).   
Jackson-Smith and Sharp (2008) find that more than half of national farm sales are derived 
by farms now operating at the rural-urban interface.  An estimated 91 percent of the nation's fruit 
production and 78 percent of vegetable production occurs in counties designated by the USDA's 
Economic Research Service as "urban-influenced" (American Farmland Trust 2013). 
Notwithstanding these land use trends, farmland remains an abundant resource on a national 
scale and domestic food self sufficiency is not imminently imperiled.  However, at state and 
local levels, concern over farmland fragmentation and conversion (and the loss of associated 
non-market amenities) has assumed an elevated position in public policy discourse, particularly 
in the Northeast region.  In the 1970s, states began creating purchase of development rights 
(PDR) programs to preserve farmland and rural amenities, advance growth management 
objectives, and support farming as a business.1  As of May 2012, 27 states have created PDR 
programs as a tool to preserve farmland.  These programs have preserved nearly 2.3 million 
acres at a cost of $5.7 billion (AFT 2012).  Program activity has been heavily concentrated in the 
New England and greater Mid-Atlantic states. 
Despite these substantial investments in PDR, empirical assessment of program success in 
effectuating the legislative intent of publically funded farmland preservation is limited.  
Common metrics of progress (e.g., acreage enrollment statistics) provide little insight, for 
example, into the effects of public farmland preservation investments on the economic 
performance and viability of preserved farms.  Previous research has focused on the effects of 
easement restrictions on preserved farmland values (Nickerson and Lynch 2001; Lynch, Gray, 
and Geoghegan 2007; Anderson and Weinhold 2008; Lynch, Gray, and Geoghegan 2010) and 
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whether landowners invest easement monies in farm improvements and modernization (Lynch 
2007; Lynch and Duke 2007; Duke and Invento 2004).  Important questions, however, remain 
unanswered.  Among them is whether farmland preservation is having a meaningful impact on 
the economic viability of farms, particularly in urban-influenced areas where farming and 
associated support infrastructure has undergone significant decline. 
The objectives of this study are therefore to empirically examine the impact of PDR program 
participation on farm profitability and evaluate whether effects of participation are 
heterogeneous across different farm types.  This is accomplished by estimating the average 
"treatment effect" of participating in farmland preservation on per-acre farm profitability.  A 
challenge with this type of observational study lies in an inability to assume that treatment 
assignment (i.e., voluntary participation in a PDR program) is random.  We employ a propensity 
score matching approach (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983a) to address issues of selection bias 
arising from a landowner's self-assignment into the treatment by controlling for inherent 
differences that may exist between preserved and unpreserved farms.  New Jersey, a leader in 
farmland preservation, provides the geographic context for the analysis. 
The balance of the paper is organized as follows.  The following section provides 
background on the use of PDR as a farmland preservation technique.  The third section 
introduces the propensity score matching technique and provides theoretical examination of 
factors that may influence a landowner's decision to preserved farmland.  The fourth section 
describes data and matching estimators used in the analysis.  The fifth section presents empirical 
results.  The final section provides concluding remarks and policy implications. 
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2. Background on PDR Programs 
Over the past several decades, the unquestioned acceptance and encouragement of growth 
has shifted to a more tempered realization of the potential negative effect development has on 
rural economies, land use, and culture (Fodor 1999; Libby 2005).  This has led to substantial 
academic discourse and planning practitioner attention centered on land use (Burchell et al. 
2005).  Farm retention and the cycle of decline predicted as urban expansion and exurban growth 
pressures expand into rural-agricultural regions has been a specific thread of academic research 
since the 1970s (Berry 1978; Fischel 1982; Lisansky 1986; Lopez, Adelaja, and Andrews 1988; 
Daniels and Bowers 1997; Daniels and Lapping 2003; Lynch and Carpenter 2003; Oberholtzer, 
Clancy, and Esseks 2011).  Embedded within this thread is the concept of a critical mass in 
agriculture, the premise that a local farming industry will become unsustainable once agricultural 
infrastructure (e.g., farms, farmland, agricultural suppliers and markets) declines to a certain 
level (Daniels and Lapping 2001; Lynch and Carpenter 2003).  The "impermanence syndrome" 
is one symptom of this problem in urbanizing areas, as uncertainty about the long-term viability 
of agriculture causes farmers to reduce their planning horizons in farming and, subsequently, 
curtail investments in farm technology and modernization (Berry 1978; Lopez et al. 1988; 
Adelaja et al. 2011).  
Various farm retention mechanisms have been adopted in all fifty U.S. states to mitigate the 
adverse impacts of development on agriculture, including use-value assessment for farmland, 
right to farm legal protections, agricultural zoning, and farmland preservation programs.  Support 
for farm retention in urban-influenced areas is commonly rooted in the public's interest in 
maintaining rural amenities conferred by farms that are often quasi-public goods under-
provisioned in land markets (i.e., ecological and environmental services, cultural heritage, local 
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food availability, and outdoor recreational opportunities), growth management, and retention of 
capacity for local food production (Gardner 1977; Bromley and Hodge 1990; Lopez, Shah and 
Altobella 1994; Kline and Wichelns 1996; Hellerstein et al. 2002; Nickerson and Hellerstein 
2003; Duke and Ilvento 2004a; Bergstrom et al. 2011).  
While zoning and use value assessment programs may slow farmland loss and support the 
economic viability of farming, neither is a permanent form of land preservation.  In contrast, a 
purchase of development rights program affords permanent protection of farmland from 
conversion to non-agricultural development.  Participation in a PDR program requires a 
landowner to forfeit the right to develop farmland for nonagricultural purposes and a 
conservation easement (a negative easement) is placed on the land.  In exchange, the landowner 
receives a monetary payment (or, in some cases, a tax incentive) and retains ownership and all 
other land rights.  
PDR programs are an attractive public policy from a property rights perspective because 
landowner equity is protected due to the voluntary and compensatory nature of program 
participation, thus avoiding political and legal challenges to the constitutionality of regulatory-
based land management approaches (Daniels and Bowers 1997; Echeverria 2005).  In addition to 
the permanence of farmland protections, PDR programs offer several other advantages.  It is 
theorized that the infusion of easement monies may help reverse the impermanence syndrome 
which Berry (1978) identified as afflicting urban-influenced farms. However, Duke and Ilvento 
(2004b) find that the majority of preserved farmland owners in Delaware used easement monies 
for personal savings or investments.  Further, restricting future non-agricultural development 
options should, again in theory, reduce the cost of farmland.  However, empirical research has 
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yielded mixed results on the presence and extent of price reductions (see, for example, Nickerson 
and Lynch 2001; Anderson and Weinhold 2008; Lynch, Gray, and Geoghegan 2010).  
A downside of PDR programs is the large public expenditures required to purchase 
easements and the uncertainties regarding public funding availability.  More than 10 years ago, it 
was estimated that the cost of preserving U.S. cropland faced with urbanization pressure would 
cost $130 billion (Heimlich and Anderson 2001).   Further, PDR deeds of easements restrict 
future nonagricultural development, but do not require that land be actively farmed (Daniels & 
Bowers 1997).  Lastly, Liu and Lynch (2011) observe that PDR programs are less able to protect 
large contiguous blocks of farmland and industry agglomeration benefits than zoning policies. 
2.1  Farmland Preservation in New Jersey 
New Jersey is a highly urbanized state bordered by the major New York City and 
Philadelphia metropolitan centers.  Approximately 16 percent of the state land base (733,000 
acres) remains in agricultural production (USDA-NASS 2009).  Most of this farmland lies on the 
western half of the state in areas under significant urban influence (Figure 1).  The most 
agriculturally productive region of the state lies southwest of Philadelphia and includes 
Cumberland, Gloucester and Salem counties wherein the state's high-value horticultural 
production is concentrated.  Another farming intensive region lies in the central/western region 
of the state and comprises northern Burlington County, a nationally recognized leader in 
farmland preservation, and parts of western Monmouth, Mercer, and southern Middlesex 
counties.  
Since its creation in 1983, 2,200 farms and approximately 205,000 acres of farmland have 
been preserved under New Jersey's farmland preservation program (SADC 2013).  New Jersey 
has preserved the highest proportion (28%) of its farmland base among all fifty states (AFT 
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2012).  More than 83 percent of preserved farmland acreage is contained within three large 
clusters of program activity (Figure 2).  The largest is in the northwest part of the state 
(approximately 70,000 acres).  The central and southwest clusters comprise roughly 55,000 acres 
48,000 acres, respectively. 
 
3. Methodology 
In experimental studies, treatment assignment can be randomized and, therefore, comparison 
of potential outcomes between treated and control groups can provide statistically reliable 
estimates of treatment effects.  Farm enrollment in a PDR program, however, is not random due 
to the voluntary nature of the program.  Estimation of the effect of participation in a PDR 
program on farm profitability may be confounded by the possible correlation between farm 
profitability outcomes and factors influencing a landowner's decision to preserve farmland.  For 
example, the owner of a more (or less) profitable farm may hypothetically be less (or more) 
likely to sell development rights.   
To overcome the problem of selection bias, we can use the potential outcome framework 
with two potential outcomes Y1 (a profitability outcome for preserved (treated) farms) and Y0 (a 
profitability outcome for unpreserved, or control, farms).  The observed profitability outcome for 
any individual farm i can be written as: 01 )1( iiiii YTYTY −+= , where T{0,1} indicates 
treatment status, with T=1 if a farm is preserved.  The gain/loss of individual farm i from 
participating in the program is 01 iii YY −= .  Because we cannot observe both outcomes for 
individual farm i, estimating the individual farm treatment effect i  is not possible and we have 
to concentrate on (population) average treatment effects (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008).  The 
most commonly-used evaluation parameter is the “average treatment effect on the treated" 
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(ATT), which in our context represents the difference between the expected profitability of 
preserved farms and the expected profitability of unpreserved farms had they been preserved.  
Algebraically, this can be explained as )1()1( 01 =−== TYETYEATT . 
As a practical matter, we cannot observe )1( 0 =TYE because treatment assignment is 
mutually exclusive; a farm is either preserved or it is not. Estimating the ATT associated with 
PDR program participation by comparing the mean difference between )1( 1 =TYE and 
)0( 0 =TYE will be erroneous due to selection bias (i.e., there may be inherent differences 
between farms that enter a PDR program and those that do not). 
To address selection bias, a growing number of studies have used the propensity score 
matching (PSM) technique proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983a) (see, for example, Liu 
and Lynch (2007) and Uematsu and Mishra (2012) for examples within an agricultural policy 
context). To evaluate whether the profitability impacts of PDR program participation are 
heterogeneous across farm types and to lessen the possibility of mismatching, we implement a 
perfect match as first applied in Heckman et al. (1997; 1998) by splitting the full sample into 
three subgroups of farm types according to the differences in economic scale and operator 
characteristics. The first subgroup (residential lifestyle/retirement farm) includes small family 
farms operated by individuals for whom farming is not a primary occupation or retired persons. 
The second subgroup (small farms with low sales) includes small family farms with low sales 
(<$100,000 gross sales) that are operated by individuals for whom farming is a primary 
occupation. The last subgroup (commercial farms) includes family farms with high sales 
(>$100,000 gross sales) that are operated by individuals for whom farming is a primary 
occupation. 
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To ensure that the covariates balancing property is satisfied, we employ the method 
suggested by Becker and Inchino (2002) as a prematching test.  We also conduct a post-matching 
balancing test.2  Once the post-matching balancing test is satisfied, the matching of preserved 
and unpreserved farms based on estimated propensity scores is utilized to derive the impact of 
the PDR programs on profitability outcomes.  To ensure overlap in the distributions of covariates 
X in the preserved and unpreserved farms, this study imposes the common support criterion.  In 
addition to the imposition of common support, we address the problem of limited overlap in the 
covariate distributions between preserved and unpreserved farms using the trimming method 
proposed by Crump et al. (2009).   
 Application of the PSM technique requires the estimation of the predicted probability of 
being in the treatment group, based on observed factors that simultaneously influence the 
landowner's enrollment in a PDR program and farm profitability.  This is achieved through the 
estimation of a probit model wherein a farm's preservation status (a binary treatment variable) is 
regressed on independent variables linked to a landowner's PDR program participation decision 
and farm profitability.  The set of independent variables in this study is derived from theoretical 
underpinnings advanced by Nickerson and Lynch (2001) and Lynch and Lovell (2003).  
Generally, a farm owner is assumed to be an economically rational agent seeking to maximize 
the present value of utility derived from owning the land over a given planning horizon, which is 
determined by agricultural returns per acre, various farm and operator characteristics, off-farm 
income, non-consumptive values derived from land ownership, and expectations of development 
proceeds.  We extend this conventional framework by explicitly accounting for empirical 
observations that the prices of preserved farms sold in arms-length market transactions may be 
higher than those predicted by economic theory due to capitalized value of amenities or retained 
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development opportunities (see, for example, Nickerson and Lynch 2001, Anderson and 
Weinhold 2008, Schilling, Sullivan and Duke 2013).3  More specifically, we hypothesize that a 
landowner's decision to enroll land in a PDR program may be influenced by expectations that 
preserved farmland may be sold for prices in excess of capitalized agricultural rents in certain 
land markets due to demand for rural residences. More details on the theoretical framework are 
provided in the Appendix. 
 
4. Data 
Data in our analysis are derived primarily from respondent-level 2007 Census of Agriculture records 
collected by the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) and administrative records of the State 
Agriculture Development Committee (SADC), the administrative agency responsible for the New Jersey 
farmland preservation program.  Additional data for covariates used in the first-stage probit model were 
collected from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's Bureau of Geographic 
Information Systems, the Office of the New Jersey State Climatologist, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
and U.S. Census Bureau.  
The federal Census of Agriculture is conducted every five years, providing detailed information on 
agricultural land use, farm and operator characteristics, farm income and expenses, and other information 
needed to understand the structure and trends of the United States farm sector.  The initial Census of 
Agriculture dataset, accessed through the New Jersey Field Office of NASS, contained 7,575 complete 
respondent-level records for New Jersey farms.  Through March 2007, SADC records documented 1,621 
farmland preservation closings.4    Each PDR closing was aligned to a corresponding Census record based 
on examination of block and lot designations and secondary validity checks (e.g., parcel acreage, physical 
address, owner name, etc.).  PDR closings for which Census records are unavailable (i.e., the farm owner 
did not participate in the Census) were omitted.  In many instances, multiple farmland preservation 
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closings were combined to link to a single farm management unit in Census.5  In the resulting merged 
dataset, 789 of 7,575 Census records were identified as having preserved acreage. 
In the first stage of PSM analysis, a probit model is estimated with a dependent variable 
(PRESERVED) defined as '1' if any portion of a subject farm was enrolled in the farmland preservation 
program between 2003 and April 2007, and '0' otherwise.  This definition was predicated on the practical 
challenges of including pre-2003 farmland preservation closings (i.e., less complete or accessible program 
records) and the need to limit potential causality problems between the treatment variable and observed 
covariates in the propensity score estimation.  Further, this timeframe marked a period of significant 
enrollment in the state's PDR program due to the availability of stable state funding for land preservation.  
The dataset was therefore refined to exclude 351 records for farms preserved prior to 2003.  Farms that do 
not meet the SADC's minimum eligibility criteria for PDR program enrollment (n=2,735) were also 
excluded from the final dataset to reduce the problem of mismatching farms.6  Lastly, since the farmland 
owner decides whether or not to enroll in the PDR program and receives the direct financial benefits of 
participation (e.g., an easement payment), we also exclude 460 farm records (66 of which are preserved 
farms) associated with individuals that do not own any of the land they farm.  The final dataset used in the 
analysis comprised 4,029 farms, of which 372 were classified as preserved farms. 
Table 1 summarizes the outcome measure used to calculate average treatment effects and 
variables used in the probit model of factors affecting the probability of a farm entering New 
Jersey's PDR program.  The farm profitability outcome measure used for estimating ATTs is 
agricultural profit per acre (PROFIT), which is derived as total farm sales per acre minus total 
farm expenses per acre.  Following the theoretical framework discussed in section 3 and the 
Appendix, three categories of independent variables are constructed: farm and landowner 
characteristics, agricultural returns, and development potential of land.   
Farm and landowner characteristics include farm acreage and the gender, age, and farming 
experience of the primary farm operator.  The presence of an heir interested in farming (HEIR) 
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was proxied by a constructed binary variable with an assigned value of '1' if  the farm has at least 
two operators and at least one additional farm operator spends the majority of his/her time 
employed in agriculture (and is not a hired manager).  Two additional binary variables are 
included to capture whether the operator works off-farm for more than 100 days and whether 
rental income comprised the largest source of farm income. 
Agricultural returns were proxied by a series of agricultural price or expense indices (i.e., 
crop, cattle, poultry, and labor) and a binary variable indicating whether the farm engaged in 
direct-to-consumer sales.  Underlying farm productivity factors include the percentage of the 
farm's soils classified as prime, average seasonal growing temperature, and annual precipitation.  
Two variables were included to capture potential industry agglomeration effects, the number of 
farms located within the subject farm's municipality and the change in municipal agricultural 
land area recorded between 1986 and 2007.   
Land development potential was captured by population density variables, median housing 
value and the distance between the farm and nearest major city.  RESIDUAL_VALUE is a 
municipal-level variable capturing the difference between the average estimated deed restricted 
value of preserved farms (i.e., the estimated "after value" calculated by the SADC for purposes 
of calculating easement payments) and sales prices of preserved farms observed between 1990 
and 2007.   All values are converted to 2007 dollars by using the urban consumer price index of 
owners' equivalent rent of primary residence provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for variables used in the analysis for preserved and 
unpreserved farms across the full sample of farms and the three farm type subgroups. As the first 
data row demonstrates, per-acre farm profitability is higher for preserved farms, relative to 
unpreserved farms, in the full sample and the 'small farms/low sales' subsample.  A test of mean 
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difference between preserved and unpreserved farms reveals no statistically significant 
difference between preserved and unpreserved farms across the full sample and all subgroups.  
However, conclusions about the effect of farmland preservation on farm profitability based upon 
these simple means comparisons are to be avoided because of underlying differences between 
the two cohorts of farms. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1  Probit Model Estimation 
To address the bias problem from self selection into the New Jersey PDR program, we 
employ the propensity score matching technique.  The propensity score is the probability of a 
farm receiving the treatment (i.e., being preserved).  In our analysis, this is derived by estimating 
a probit model regressing the binary dependent variable (PRESERVED) on a multi-dimensional 
vector of covariates that economic theory and empirical literature predict will influence the 
landowner participation decision and farm profitability.  The propensity score for each farm is 
calculated as the predicted value from the regression.  Farms are matched based on their 
propensity scores using several matching estimators, as described in section 5.2.  
Probit models were estimated using the full sample of farms and subsamples comprising 
residential lifestyle/retirement farms, small farms with low sales, and commercial farms.  Table 3 
provides the parameter estimates obtained from each model.  All four models perform well 
according to hit rate, as shown in the last row, and results generally converge with profit theory 
and existing literature on farmland preservation.  
Model results show that having an heir interested in farming, operator age, reliance on off-
farm employment, generation of direct marketing revenue, total annual precipitation, and the 
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percentage change in agricultural land area do not influence the probability of program 
participation. An inverted U-shape relationship is found between the likelihood of program 
participation and farm acreage in all groups.  While New Jersey is geographically small, there is 
noted microclimatic and soil variability across the state.  Farms in areas with higher mean 
temperatures during the growing season are more likely to enroll in farmland preservation.  Not 
surprisingly given the importance of soil quality in the prioritization of farms for preservation, 
farms with greater proportions of prime soil are more likely to participate in the PDR program; 
however, this parameter is only significant for the residential lifestyle/retirement and commercial 
subsamples. 
Farms in municipalities with a greater number of farms are more likely to participate in 
farmland preservation.  However, this influence diminishes in municipalities with very large 
numbers of farms, perhaps reflecting the disinclination of landowners in rural areas to preserve 
farmland due to the absence of intense development and lower prevailing easement values.  In a 
similar manner, the probability of a farm participating in the PDR program tends to increase as 
the residual value rises and again diminishes at high levels of residual value in the full sample 
and the subsample of residential lifestyle/retirement farms. 
5.2  Matching Estimators 
The selection of appropriate matching algorithms depends on the number of observations in 
the treatment and the control groups and the distribution of estimated propensity scores 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997).  We estimate the 
distributions of the estimated propensity scores for the full sample and each subgroup for 
preserved and unpreserved farms using estimated coefficients from the probit model.  As 
reflected in Figure 3, the distributions across preserved and unpreserved farm groups are 
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generally different.  Although distributions tend to be similar at the lower range of the estimated 
propensity scores, they become more divergent at the higher range.   
To ensure the robustness of our findings, we utilize several matching algorithms.  We first 
use the most straightforward matching estimator, the nearest neighbor matching (NN1) with 
replacement. However, NN1 matching may result in poor matches if the closest neighbor is far 
away.  Therefore, we also use the radius matching with caliper recommended by Dehejia and 
Wahba (2002) to increase matching quality.7  However, as discussed in Smith and Todd (2005), 
it is difficult to know a priori what tolerance level is reasonable. We use the calipers of 0.02 and 
0.05 in this study.  Because there are a large number of comparable untreated (unpreserved farm) 
observations in the full sample and subgroups, we also use oversampling with ten matching 
partners (NN10), kernel and local linear matching algorithms.8 For kernel and local linear 
matching, a Gaussian kernel function is used.  The optimal bandwidth is selected using the rule 
of thumb suggested by Silverman (1986).9  
The quality of matching outcomes was evaluated for each matching estimator on the basis of 
percent reduction of pseudo R2, Chi-square, and mean standardized bias. [Reviewer note: 
Supplemental document table S1 summarizes these matching quality indicators for the full 
sample and each farm type subgroup.]  Overall, all matching estimators yielded relatively good 
matching quality; NN1 provided the poorest matching quality in all groups.  There are no 
statistically significant differences between mean values of preserved and unpreserved farms 
after matching based on all covariates X in the full sample or subgroups, providing confidence 
that our matching results satisfy the balancing property. [Reviewer Note: The results of the 
balancing test for mean difference of all covariates X before and after matching are provided in 
supplemental document table S2.] 
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5.3  Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATTs) 
Average treatment effects on the treated in the full sample and farm type subgroups are 
shown in Table 4.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses under each estimated treatment 
effect. We present the estimated ATTs and their associated standard errors by imposing common 
support and the trimming approach (thick support) suggested by Crump et al. (2009) in all 
cases.10 
Estimated ATTs in the full sample are positive across all matching techniques (except for 
NN10 matching method with usual common support), but not statistically significant at the 10 
percent level.  For the residential lifestyle/retirement subgroup, estimated ATTs derived using 
four of the six matching indicators are negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent level 
when imposing common support.  The profitability of preserved farms ranges from $196 to $202 
less per acre than matched unpreserved farms.  However, after addressing the problem of limited 
overlap in the covariates distributions between preserved and unpreserved farms (i.e., the 
imposition of thick support), the ATTs are not statistically significant across all matching 
estimators. 
The negative or insignificant effects of PDR participation on residential lifestyle/retirement 
farms are not altogether unexpected.  Owners of small farms seeking to fulfill rural lifestyle 
preferences or farmers wishing to spend their retirement years on their farms may have 
diminished profit motives.  For them, agricultural income may be supplemental to off-farm or 
retirement income or scaled to qualify their property for the tax advantages of agricultural use 
value assessment.  While not empirically tested in this study, participation in a PDR program 
may also serve as an exit strategy from agriculture for retirement age landowners.  A large 
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easement payment may provide financial liquidity needed for estate planning and transfer 
purposes, or serve to extract capital to support retirement. 
All matching estimators yielded statistically significant ATTs for farms in the small farm/low 
sales subsample.  Preserved farm profitability is estimated to be between $266 and $453 higher 
per acre than it is for observationally equivalent unpreserved farms.  Refining the results to those 
generated from the matching algorithms having the best matching quality narrows the 
profitability differentials to a range of $414 to $436.  One explanation for the improved 
profitability of preserved farms may be the influx of capital into farm businesses afforded by 
selling development rights.  The infusion of easement payments to these relatively small farms 
(farms in this subsample have annual sales of less than $100,000) may expand opportunities to 
increase farm acreage, restructure debt, mechanize and modernize operations, diversify products 
and markets, or transition into value added enterprises.   
For the commercial farm subgroup, the matching estimators produced ATTs that are widely 
variable, but not statistically significant. This result is interesting and warrants additional 
research.  The authors speculate that farms in this subgroup may pursue alternative profit-
enhancing strategies.  For example, rather than intensifying production on existing acreage 
(earning more profit per acre), anecdotal evidence from southern New Jersey suggests that large, 
multigenerational horticulture farms are actively expanding landholdings to achieve higher 
profitability. 
Using a recent simulation-based sensitivity analysis employed in Ichino, Mealli, and 
Nannicini (2008), we confirm that results are robust to unobserved factors influencing the 
participation decision and farm profitability.11  [Reviewer Note: The results of the sensitivity 
analysis conducted on the subgroup of small farms with low sales are provided in supplemental 
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document tables S3 and S4 with detailed explanation.] We also use Rosenbaum bounds with 1x1 
matched pairs (see details in Rosenbaum 2002) and find that our results are robust with the 
threshold gamma measuring the effect strength of unobserved variables on treatment assignment 
equal to 1.25 (with 95% confidence interval). This means that the statistical significance of the 
ATT for profit per acre would be questionable if the odds ratio of having a PDR program 
between enrolled and non-enrolled farms differs by more than 1.25. 
 
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
As a policy evaluation, this study examines whether New Jersey's PDR program is 
strengthening the agricultural industry, a legislative goal articulated in the enabling statute 
[NJSA 4:1C-11 et seq].  In practice, this is often interpreted as enhancing the economic viability 
of farming. Farmland preservation is theorized to aid the farm economy in several ways.  The 
retention of large contiguous areas of farmland can provide agglomeration economies, reduce 
location conflicts (i.e., right to farm disputes), enhance operational efficiency, and remove 
speculative pressures from farmland markets.  In theory, deed-restricted farmland should be less 
expensive than unpreserved farmland, thus reducing a substantial new farmer entrance barrier 
and enabling less costly expansion of existing farms.  Easement payments provide farmers with 
financial liquidity that may be used to expand or modernize agricultural operations, or restructure 
debt, although such funds are also used for household consumption and personal investments 
(Esseks and Schilling, 2013; Duke and Ilvento, 2004b). 
Sokolow (2006), in his national assessment of leading U.S. farmland preservation programs 
concluded that the agricultural economic impacts of PDR programs are unclear.  Focusing 
primarily on the effects of agricultural land retention on farm supplier and market infrastructure, 
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he argues that the “accumulation of permanently preserved farmland through easements by itself 
has had little direct impact so far on the overall condition of local agricultural economies.”  
However, he qualifies this generalization with the perspectives of county and state farmland 
preservation program administrators that PDR participation does benefit individual farm 
economics in the form of capital for expansion and debt retirement, infrastructure improvements, 
or transition to other commodities and alternative agricultural business ventures.  The extent to 
which these theorized economic benefits of PDR participation are being realized by farms has 
not been well studied empirically.   
To the authors' knowledge, this study is the first to directly measure the impact of farmland 
preservation on farm profitability, while controlling for program self-selection effects.  As such, 
it represents a useful extension to the PDR program evaluation literature.  Public expenditures on 
PDR programs in the U.S. (particularly in the eastern states) have been substantial, totaling 
several billion dollars.  In a climate of fiscal austerity, many state programs are facing 
uncertainties over future funding and increasing accountability to policy makers seeking 
evidence of program impacts.  Progress reports relying on farm and acreage enrollments are self-
evident metrics.  However, PDR program administrators faced with the need to justify further 
program funding would benefit from credible information on their programs' impacts on farm-
level viability and broader economic development.  Our results suggest that farmland 
preservation is advancing farm economic development objectives, at least for small to mid-sized 
commercial farms.  This is encouraging because of the concentration of the state's agricultural 
output among commercial farms, notwithstanding the lack of statistically significant ATTs found 
within the sub-category comprising the state's largest farms. 
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Analysis within our sample shows that the majority of farmland preserved in New Jersey is 
associated with farms operated by persons for whom farming is a principal occupation (Table 
2).12  Our findings suggest that the profitability of "low sales" farms (farms with <$100,000 in 
annual sales that are operated by individuals for whom farming is a principal occupation) is 
enhanced by farmland preservation.  Our most conservative estimates reveal that preserved farms 
in the 'small farms/low sales' cohort earn $414 to $436 more per acre in profit than their 
unpreserved counterparts.  This finding comports with program administrator accounts reported 
by Sokolow (2006) and provides optimism that PDR participation may be a gateway through 
which small farms may modernize, expand, or transition into more lucrative ventures.  It casts an 
optimistic light on long-standing, and often bleak, national dialogue on the challenges facing 
small-scale farms, as encapsulated in a 1988 Council for Agricultural Science and Technology, 
which notes:  "[t]he future viability of the adequate size, well-managed commercial farms, and 
the part-time smaller farms is not in doubt. The future is much in doubt, however, for full-time 
family farms lacking a strong financial or managerial base, too small to realize economies of 
size, and too demanding of labor and management for the operator and family to earn substantial 
off-farm income.” 
A fundamental observation emerges from this study regarding the use of PDR funding to 
preserve smaller "lifestyle" farms.  We find some evidence that the profitability of 
lifestyle/retirement farms is lower for preserved farms, relative to their unpreserved counterparts.  
This may be a signal that farmland preservation, and ostensibly the infusion of capital into the 
farm household, further dampens what in many cases is an already limited agricultural profit 
motive.  In other instances, it may reflect the use of PDR as an exit strategy for retiring farmers.  
PDR easement payments, rather than being invested in the farming operation, may provide 
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financial liquidity needed for estate planning and transfer. However, New Jersey's conservation 
easements are perpetual, raising an important question about the future disposition of these 
preserved farms.  Who will farm them?  Will they be made accessible to farmers seeking 
expansion, or new farmers?  From a policy perspective, this suggests the importance of having 
programs aimed at facilitating farmland access, linking owners of preserved farmland with 
individuals interested in farming.  For example, the State Agriculture Development Committee 
and the New Jersey chapter of the Northeast Organic Farming Association recently collaborated 
on a farmland leasing project.  Key components of the initiative include networking meetings 
between owners of farmland (preserved and unpreserved) and farmers interested in leasing land, 
and associated online land linking resources. 
A related policy question surfaces regarding the desirability of using limited public resources 
to preserve small farms presently supporting rural-residential lifestyles.  Holding all else 
constant, economic theory predicts (and observation supports) that per-acre easement costs will 
be higher for smaller properties, relative to larger farms.  Should very small acreage "lifestyle" 
farms be de-prioritized for preservation, allowing the reallocation of funding resources toward 
larger farms?  For example, the current eligibility criteria for small (under 10 acre) farms to enter 
farmland preservation require documented annual sales of at least $2,500.  This criterion could 
be made more stringent; however, the consequences of such policy revisions need to be carefully 
contemplated.  A prime farmland parcel may be minimally farmed today (for purposes of 
discussion, assume a purely "hobby" agricultural venture) but could be more intensively farmed 
in the future.  Is it a viable policy alternative to preclude preserving this parcel on the basis of 
low current productivity when the underlying soil resources are of high quality?   
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While ostensibly rational from a purely cost-effectiveness perspective, it may be politically 
unpalatable to forego preservation of small acreage lifestyle farms (or implement a policy 
change, such as a per-acre easement cap, that has the practical effect of reducing the likelihood 
of such farms being preserved) , which are often located in suburban or urbanizing parts of the 
state.  As farms in these areas become more scarce, remaining farms become more valued on the 
basis of their amenity benefits (e.g., open space, access to produce at farm markets, etc.).  The 
retention of these urban fringe farms may be necessary for maintaining the political support 
needed to secure additional statewide funding for land preservation.   
Avoiding the preservation of smaller farms may also be incongruent with state farmland 
preservation goals. When Governor Christine Todd Whitman signed the landmark Garden State 
Preservation Trust Act into law in 1998, she articulated an ambitious (and ultimately unattained) 
goal of preserving 500,000 acres of farmland within ten years.  To that point, the average size of 
farms preserved under the state PDR program was 148 acres.  In the second and third decades 
since, preserved farms averaged 86 and 75 acres in size, respectively.  In most preservation 
project areas, early efforts focused on acquiring easements on large, keystone properties.  Now 
effort is shifting toward  "filling in" preservation gaps to achieve the goal of protecting large, 
contiguous clusters of farmland and minimizing further fragmentation of the state's farmland 
base.  Comprehensive county farmland preservation plans developed in recent years target an 
additional 4,314 farms and 242,000 acres of farmland for preservation.  Taking a simple average, 
this implies a further drop in the average size of targeted farms to 56 acres.  
Lastly, another consideration that surfaces when considering the implications of preserving 
low-intensity lifestyle farms is the fact that New Jersey's standard deed of easement requires that 
preserved farmland remain available for agriculture, not remain in agriculture.  This is a long-
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standing topic of debate in the state's agricultural policy circles.  Our findings suggest that this 
"available for" clause allows farmland preserved at considerable public expense to be diverted 
from active, more intensive farming.  If strengthening the farming industry is a goal of PDR 
programs, policy makers may be justified in revisiting deed of easement provisions requiring 
farmland be kept in active agriculture. 
It is important to conclude with limitations of this study that may warrant further academic 
consideration.  First, our study design defines a farm to be preserved if any of its acreage is 
preserved under the state PDR program.  Land tenure, particularly among very large farms, is 
complex.  It is common for a large farm owner to aggregate multiple farms parcels under one 
farm management unit.  This raises the question whether the extent to which a farm's acreage is 
preserved matters.  It is interesting to consider whether there is a dose-response function evident 
when farms participate in farmland preservation.  In other words, does the size of treatment (i.e., 
the percentage of a farm that is preserved) influence farm profitability?  Second, 2003-2007 
marked a period of significant farm enrollment in the New Jersey PDR program.  Data 
challenges made it impractical to examine farms preserved prior to 2003 and the truncated time 
frame in our analysis may not fully capture profitability impacts stemming from the sale of farm 
development rights.  Third, it is theorized that the observed lack of statistically significant ATTs 
for the commercial farms subgroup may result from larger farms operating at higher levels of 
technical efficiency than smaller farms due to greater financial liquidity or scale economies that 
enable investments in equipment and technology adoption.  For these operations, farm expansion 
may be a more dominant strategy for achieving higher profits than production intensification 
(i.e., increasing profits per acre).  This implies the need to examine a different outcome measure 
to evaluate whether and how PDR participation affects the economics of larger farms.  Finally, 
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cost-related data limitations precluded examination of the potential effects of agglomeration 
benefits that may accrue as large contiguous blocks of preserved farmland are created.  The 
incorporation of spatial data on preserved farmland contiguity into future assessments of PDR 
program impacts would be valuable from a policy evaluation perspective. 
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Appendix: Theoretical Framework of Landowners' Participation Decision 
In the framework, we assume that a landowner has two options.  First, a landowner may 
choose to farm until an optimal farm sale date, at which time all rights to the farmland are sold in 
a market transaction.  Alternatively, the landowner may select to participate in a PDR program, 
selling only rights to develop the land for non-agricultural purposes in exchange for an easement 
payment.  In the latter case, the landowner may continue to farm or sell the deed-restricted 
farmland at an optimal date for a net payment equivalent to the sum of the future stream of net 
agricultural returns and residual non-agricultural consumptive value (i.e., utility derived from 
living in a rural residence), which is the difference between the preserved farm sales price and its 
agricultural value.  
Let the participation decision of landowner i be represented by φ. A decision to participate in 
a PDR program is denoted by φ  = 1 (φ  = 0 if the landowner does not participate).  We assume 
that the participation decision, φ, maximizes the present value of his/her utility over the planning 
horizon given the discount rate r and the landowner i’s time preference, ρ.  Allowing, Xi,  to 
represent landowner and farm characteristics in each period  , the utility of the landowner i can 
be modeled as a function of: the net agricultural returns per acres, ),( iagi XR ; off-farm income, 
),( ioffi XR ; the non-consumptive value of participation, ),( inonconsumi XR ; the net payment from 
selling farmland in the market for the developed use at optimal date *1t , ),( *1tXV idevi ; the net 
easement payment from selling non-agricultural development rights at the beginning period, 
)0,( ii XE ; and the residual value of preserved farmland sold at optimal date *2t , ),( *2tXV iresidi 13 
(Equation A1). A landowner will participate in the PDR program if the present value of utility 
derived from participation is greater than the present value of utility associated with farming 
until the optimal sales date and then selling their land. 
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Table 1. Description of variables 
Variables Description 
Potential Outcome and Treatment  
PROFIT  Profit per acre derived as total sales minus total farm expenses per acre 
PRESERVED Whether any portion of the farm was preserved between 2003-2007 (equal 
to 1 if preserved) 
Farm and Landowner Characteristics 
GENDER Gender of the principal operator (equal to 1 if male) 
AGE Age of the principal operator 
EXPERIENCE Number of years the principal operator operated on the farm 
HEIR Whether the principal operator has an heir to continue farming (equal to 1 
if yes) 
OFF-FARM Whether the principal operator worked off farm more than 100 days  
(equal to 1 if yes) 
RENTAL_INC Whether the largest source of farm income was rental income (equal to 1 
if yes) 
ACRES  Total acres of farmland operated 
Agricultural Returns 
DIRECT_SALES Whether the farm has revenue from direct sales (equal to 1 if yes) 
CROP_PRICES Prices received by each farm from selling crops in $/acre 
CATTLE_PRICES  Prices received by each farm from selling cattle including their dairy 
products in $/head 
POULTRY_PRICES  Prices received by each farm from selling poultry in $/head 
LABOR_COSTS Labor cost per acre 
PRIME Percent of farm acreage with soils classified as “prime” 
TEMPERATURE Municipality-level average growing seasonal temperature (°F) from April 
to September 
PRECIPITATION Municipality-level total annual precipitation (inches) 
NO_FARMS Number of farms in the municipality 
CHG_AGLAND Percent change in agricultural land area for municipality in which farm is 
located from 1986 to 2007 
Development Potential of Land 
POP_DENSITY Population density per square mile for municipality in which farm is 
located 
CHG_POPDEN Percent change in population density per square mile for municipality in 
which farm is located from 1987 to 2007  
DISTANCE  Euclidian distance, in miles, of the farm to the nearest city (New York 
City or Philadelphia) 
RESIDUAL_VALUE Average percent difference between preserved farm sales price and after 
value for municipality in which farm is located 
HOUSINGVAL Median housing value of municipality in which farm is located 
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Table 2. Summary statistics of preserved and unpreserved New Jersey farms 
  Full Sample Residential/Retirement Small Farms with Low Sales Commercial 
 Preserved Unpreserved Preserved Unpreserved Preserved Unpreserved Preserved Unpreserved 
Variables Mean Std. D. Mean Std. D. Mean Std. D. Mean Std. D. Mean Std. D. Mean Std. D. Mean Std. D. Mean Std. D. 
Profitability Outcome                 
PROFIT ($1,000) 0.54 4.55 0.20 8.06 -0.20 0.87 -0.01 4.01 -0.13 0.54 -0.79 3.95 1.91 7.49 3.53 21.20 
Farm and Landowner Characteristics                 
GENDER 0.89 0.31 0.80 0.40 0.87 0.34 0.83 0.37 0.86 0.35 0.69 0.46 0.93 0.26 0.95 0.22 
AGE 59.08 12.80 58.38 12.62 60.87 13.41 59.76 12.48 57.14 12.19 55.68 12.03 57.58 11.88 56.37 11.61 
EXPERIENCE 25.56 15.66 21.76 14.63 22.24 16.08 21.38 14.43 24.00 14.62 20.28 14.63 29.29 13.69 27.65 13.93 
HEIR 0.11 0.32 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.20 0.40 0.15 0.36 
OFF_FARM 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.46 0.50 
RENTAL_INC 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.22 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ACRES  317.56 472.26 79.35 183.76 96.84 113.47 43.95 73.12 176.78 177.67 69.25 116.36 661.54 639.73 257.28 370.44 
Agricultural Returns                 
DIRECT_SALES 0.16 0.37 0.18 0.39 0.18 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.14 0.35 0.18 0.39 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.35 
CROP_PRICES ($1,000) 5.89 27.39 6.27 52.98 2.36 14.36 2.80 17.21 10.90 50.97 3.94 24.91 8.57 27.41 29.09 145.53 
CATTLE_PRICES ($1,000) 3.02 1.78 2.89 1.13 2.63 1.19 2.81 0.86 3.16 3.21 2.86 0.79 3.40 1.52 3.39 2.24 
POULTRY_PRICES  43.08 7.65 44.08 27.30 43.35 9.46 44.23 26.74 42.32 7.01 46.09 45.74 43.43 5.85 42.85 5.18 
LABOR_COSTS ($1,000) 0.44 1.47 0.73 7.84 0.05 0.20 0.15 1.37 0.12 0.61 0.34 2.19 0.99 2.24 4.28 22.35 
PRIME 32.88 17.61 27.85 16.33 32.15 16.45 27.28 16.31 33.05 18.24 28.70 16.26 35.81 17.76 29.22 17.15 
TEMPERATURE 66.42 1.69 66.17 1.75 66.24 1.78 66.00 1.74 66.37 1.67 66.24 1.73 66.72 1.54 66.91 1.63 
PRECIPITATION 48.86 6.02 49.08 6.27 49.30 6.16 49.67 6.23 49.75 5.78 49.06 6.09 47.69 5.87 46.19 5.72 
NO_FARMS 84.60 51.35 74.52 54.04 85.12 49.27 74.12 52.10 83.55 51.62 76.79 53.85 84.58 51.92 75.60 61.61 
CHG_AGLAND -27.57 16.64 -29.51 35.28 -27.48 16.26 -29.37 44.23 -27.73 16.80 -29.42 18.23 -28.87 16.68 -28.13 18.82 
Development Potentials  
of Land                 
POP_DENSITY (1,000) 0.62 1.40 1.26 5.82 0.52 0.95 1.44 6.97 0.48 0.54 1.21 5.23 0.67 1.31 0.92 2.64 
CHG_POPDEN 41.01 45.90 32.05 34.03 42.64 46.92 33.30 35.17 44.20 47.79 30.03 29.98 41.51 48.45 27.11 34.96 
DISTANCE  36.29 10.43 37.07 11.07 37.87 11.45 37.53 11.08 35.32 9.42 36.99 10.62 35.05 9.15 34.33 11.36 
RESIDUAL_VALUE 66.27 66.30 59.34 64.74 59.50 49.85 55.81 59.27 73.83 88.95 59.75 68.87 69.53 76.51 73.76 79.24 
HOUSINGVAL ($1,000) 200.00 86.87 190.00 87.16 192.63 71.61 196.03 87.13 217.24 110.66 191.48 83.01 185.60 85.28 153.26 74.35 
No. Observations 372 3,657 138 2,052 58 580 127 410 
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Table 3. Estimated coefficients from probit models 
  Full Residential/ Retire. Low Sales Commercial 
  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Farm and Landowner Characteristics 
GENDER 0.2318** 0.1010 0.0600 0.1284 0.3895* 0.2403 -0.6118** 0.2681 
AGE -4.0E-05 0.0033 0.0020 0.0051 0.0069 0.0082 -0.0010 0.0078 
EXPERIENCE 0.0004 0.0028 -0.0243*** 0.0090 -0.0032 0.0073 -0.0007 0.0067 
EXPERIENCE^2 - - 0.0003** 0.0002 - - - - 
HEIR 0.0792 0.1008 -0.1602 0.1868 -0.1560 0.3433 0.2824 0.1840 
OFF_FARM 0.0822 0.0601 0.0010 0.0899 0.2466 0.1685 0.1449 0.1353 
RENTAL_INC 0.6845*** 0.2332 1.0087*** 0.2623 0.9556 0.6236 - - 
ACRES  0.0035*** 0.0007 0.0080*** 0.0011 0.0077*** 0.0013 0.0017*** 0.0003 
ACRES ^2 -6.9E-07*** 1.3E-07 -1.0E-05*** 2.4E-06 -7.1E-06*** 1.8E-06 -3.4E-07*** 9.0E-08 
GENDER*ACRES -0.0012 0.0007 - - - - - - 
Agricultural Returns 
DIRECT_SALES 0.0675 0.0791 -0.0060 0.1147 0.1926 0.2244 0.2540 0.2102 
CROP_PRICES 2.1E-06** 1.0E-06 1.3E-06 2.0E-06 1.6E-05*** 5.7E-06 2.4E-06 2.1E-06 
CROP_PRICES^2 - - - - -2.8E-11** 1.5E-11 - - 
CATTLE_PRICES  -4.3E-06 2.4E-05 -4.8E-05 0.0001 0.0001*** 4.8E-05 -1.8E-05 2.6E-05 
POULTRY_PRICES  -0.0017 0.0016 -0.0010 0.0018 -0.0155 0.0111 0.0112 0.0131 
LABOR_COSTS -2.8E-05*** 1.1E-05 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001** 2.4E-05 
PRIME 0.0042 0.0027 0.0087** 0.0037 -0.0038 0.0075 0.0138** 0.0060 
TEMPERATURE 0.0947** 0.0400 0.0524 0.0572 0.3644*** 0.1248 0.0739 0.0994 
PRECIPITATION -0.0082 0.0119 -0.0051 0.0166 -0.0127 0.0390 -0.0226 0.0350 
NO_FARMS 0.0077*** 0.0023 0.0092** 0.0036 0.0087 0.0061 0.0026** 0.0013 
NO_FARMS^2 -2.9E-05*** 1.1E-05 -3.6E-05** 1.7E-05 -0.0001* 2.7E-05 - - 
CHG_AGLAND 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0025 0.0054 -0.0059 0.0059 
Development Potential of Land 
POP_DENSITY -1.9E-05* 1.1E-05 -4.5E-05** 2.1E-05 -0.0001 0.0001 -1.4E-05 2.7E-05 
CHG_POPDEN 0.0019** 0.0009 0.0013 0.0012 0.0097*** 0.0027 -0.0006 0.0021 
DISTANCE  -0.0297 0.0192 -0.0507* 0.0266 -0.0189 0.0122 -0.0071 0.0122 
DISTANCE^2 0.0004* 0.0002 0.0006** 0.0003 - - - - 
RESIDUAL_VALUE 0.0029*** 0.0010 0.0026* 0.0015 0.0013 0.0010 -0.0002 0.0008 
RESIDUAL_VALUE^2 -4.6E-06** 1.9E-06 -7.2E-06* 4.1E-06 - - - - 
HOUSINGVAL 4.5E-07 4.8E-07 5.2E-06 3.7E-06 -1.4E-05** 6.0E-06 1.4E-05*** 5.4E-06 
HOUSINGVAL^2 - - -1.2E-11* 6.9E-12 2.3E-11** 9.1E-12 -2.1E-11** 8.7E-12 
Constant -8.2448*** 2.7883 -5.3159 4.0615 -25.4600*** 8.1412 -7.6038 6.9713 
Pseudo R2 0.1580 0.1350 0.2645 0.2401 
Hit Rate 0.5647 0.7374 0.7500 0.7183 
% Correct Predict 91.04 93.74 92.48 82.12 
Area under ROC curve 0.7744 0.7705 0.8518 0.8179 
Note: ***, **, * are significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses.  Models also include fixed effect dummy variables of six regions in New Jersey including 
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Delaware River, Gateway, Great Atlantic, Shore, Skylands and South Shore. Moreover, for the full 
sample model, dummy variables of farm types discussed in the methodology are also included.  “Area 
ROC” captures the area under the ROC curve. A model with no predictive power has area 0.5, while a 
perfect model has area 1 (see Green and Swets 1966). 
 
Table 4. Effect of PDR program participation on farm’s profit per acre (ATTs) 
  Matching Algorithms 
 
NN1 NN10 Kernel Local Radius Radius 
  
   
Linear 0.02 0.05 
Full Sample 
Common Support 220 -35 87 79 67 107 
 
(268) (285) (262) (273) (267) (243) 
Thick Support 213 47 94 82 64 107 
 
(278) (289) (267) (503) (286) (282) 
Residential Lifestyle/Retirement Subsample 
Common Support -228 -133 -200* -196* -198* -202* 
 
(184) (87) (113) (118) (117) (113) 
Thick Support -213 -77 -132 -190 -135 -131 
 
(187) (89) (114) (146) (122) (122) 
Small Farms with Low Sales Subsample 
Common Support 425* 414** 313** 298* 322* 266** 
 
(232) (174) (132) (165) (179) (129) 
Thick Support 453* 436** 334** 318** 322* 279** 
 
(246) (181) (144) (154) (197) (132) 
Commercial Farm Subsample 
Common Support 986 -53 -160 -43 57 -8 
 
(1291) (881) (912) (902) (1029) (953) 
Thick Support 946 -105 -131 -7 -42 19 
 
(1305) (888) (876) (936) (1101) (946) 
Note: ***, **, * are significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. The standard errors for all matching algorithms are estimated using 
bootstrapping with 1,000 replications, except for the nearest neighbor (NN1) and oversampling 
(NN10) in which we use the analytical standard error suggested by Abadie and Imbens (2006).   
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Fig. 1.  Geographic context map of New Jersey's agricultural lands. 
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Fig. 2.  Regional distribution of preserved farmland in New Jersey. 
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Fig. 3. Distributions of estimated propensity scores 
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Table S1. Matching quality indicators with imposition of common support 
  Before Matching   After Matching 
 
Mean Pseudo Chi2 
 
%Mean Bias %Chi2 % Pseudo R2 
  Bias  R2     Reduction Reduction Reduction 
Full Sample 
NN1 15.26 0.16 392.07 
 
-66.06 -72.15 -88.66 
NN10 15.26 0.16 392.07 
 
-86.19 -95.57 -98.14 
Kernel 15.26 0.16 392.07 
 
-85.61 -95.57 -98.15 
Local Linear 15.26 0.16 392.07 
 
-84.41 -94.30 -97.78 
Radius 0.02 15.26 0.16 392.07 
 
-88.20 -96.20 -98.54 
Radius 0.05 15.26 0.16 392.07 
 
-83.02 -94.94 -97.96 
Residential/Lifestyle and Retirement Subsample 
NN1 11.50 0.14 139.01 
 
-37.22 -31.85 -75.20 
NN10 11.50 0.14 139.01 
 
-79.77 -94.81 -98.06 
Kernel 11.50 0.14 139.01 
 
-83.90 -97.04 -98.91 
Local Linear 11.50 0.14 139.01 
 
-87.13 -97.04 -98.96 
Radius 0.02 11.50 0.14 139.01 
 
-83.56 -97.04 -98.90 
Radius 0.05 11.50 0.14 139.01 
 
-76.88 -92.59 -97.19 
Small Farm with Low Sales Subsample 
NN1 18.47 0.26 102.81 
 
-39.22 -41.67 -77.59 
NN10 18.47 0.26 102.81 
 
-66.43 -87.88 -95.13 
Kernel 18.47 0.26 102.81 
 
-62.46 -87.88 -95.16 
Local Linear 18.47 0.26 102.81 
 
-53.72 -86.74 -94.76 
Radius 0.02 18.47 0.26 102.81 
 
-54.74 -77.27 -91.41 
Radius 0.05 18.47 0.26 102.81 
 
-57.26 -82.58 -93.15 
Commercial Farm Subsample 
NN1 19.73 0.24 141.04 
 
-63.98 -67.92 -82.40 
NN10 19.73 0.24 141.04 
 
-78.94 -90.83 -95.08 
Kernel 19.73 0.24 141.04 
 
-80.82 -92.08 -95.55 
Local Linear 19.73 0.24 141.04 
 
-81.01 -90.42 -94.75 
Radius 0.02 19.73 0.24 141.04 
 
-75.02 -86.67 -93.17 
Radius 0.05 19.73 0.24 141.04   -78.91 -87.50 -93.17 
Note: Kernel function for kernel and local linear matching is Gaussian. Optimal bandwidth associated with the 
kernel function in each sample is obtained using the rule of thumb suggested by Silverman (1986). Results with 
thick support are very similar. The mean standardized bias (SB) before matching is given by 
))()((5.0
100
01
01
XVXV
XXSBbefore +
−= and the SB after matching is given by 
))()((5.0
100
01
01
XVXV
XXSB
MM
MM
after +
−= where X1 (V1) is the mean (variance) in the treatment group before 
matching and X0 (V0) the analogue for the control group. X1M (V1M) and X0M (V0M) are the corresponding values for 
the matched samples. 
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Table S2. Balancing test for mean difference – before and after matching 
Variable Sample Full 
Resident& 
Retire Low Sales Commercial 
GENDER*ACRES Unmatched 233.7550*** - - - 
 
Matched -2.7700 - - - 
GENDER Unmatched 0.0872*** 0.0377 0.1759*** -0.0221 
 
Matched 0.0047 0.0051 0.0090 -0.0098 
AGE Unmatched 0.7000 1.1130 1.4540 1.2120 
 
Matched -0.1860 -0.1810 -2.0310 -0.8760 
EXPERIENCE Unmatched 3.8000*** 0.8580 3.7240* 1.6370 
 
Matched -0.1120 0.0420 -1.1930 -1.2500 
EXPERIENCE^2 Unmatched - 86.1500 - - 
 
Matched - -5.7700 - - 
HEIR Unmatched 0.0385*** 0.0019 -0.0069 0.0432 
 
Matched 0.0085 0.0080 -0.0117 -0.0089 
OFF_FARM Unmatched 0.0410 0.0020 -0.0035 0.1005** 
 
Matched -0.0093 0.0068 0.0365 0.0176 
RENTAL_INC Unmatched 0.0130** 0.0415*** 0.0086 - 
 
Matched -0.0020 -0.0004 0.0057 - 
ACRES Unmatched 238.2120*** 52.8920*** 107.5320*** 404.2600*** 
 
Matched -4.0500 1.5520 -17.5900 27.6900 
ACRES^2 Unmatched 2.8E+05*** 1.5E+04*** 4.4E+04*** 6.4E+05*** 
 
Matched -2.0E+04 1.2E+03 -7.6E+03 5.0E+04 
DIRECT_SALES Unmatched -0.0173 -0.0201 -0.0431 -0.0100 
 
Matched -0.0120 0.0113 0.0250 -0.0267 
CROP_PRICES Unmatched -377.0000 -440.5000 6958.9000* -20514.9000 
 
Matched -737.9000 452.8000 4103.5000 -3972.7000 
CROP_PRICES^2 Unmatched - - 2.1E+09 - 
 
Matched - - 1.2E+09 - 
CATTLE_PRICES Unmatched 123.6000* -174.1000** 300.2000* 13.6000 
 
Matched 4.3000 -28.1000 179.4000 75.9000 
POULTRY_PRICES Unmatched -1.0090 -0.8810 -3.7710 0.5820 
 
Matched -0.0750 -0.1350 -0.9510 0.1370 
LABOR_COSTS Unmatched -291.2200 -97.0980 -225.8700 -3292.3900* 
 
Matched -17.3400 -10.5350 6.5200 -439.2000 
PRIME Unmatched 5.0250*** 4.8630*** 4.3470* 6.5870*** 
 
Matched 0.7530 0.6540 -0.9280 0.2380 
TEMPERATURE Unmatched 0.2550*** 0.2350 0.1360 -0.1920 
 
Matched 0.0410 0.0510 0.0040 0.0550 
PRECIPITATION Unmatched -0.2210 -0.3790 0.6920 1.5010** 
 
Matched -0.1300 0.0060 -0.0600 -0.2390 
NO_FARMS Unmatched 10.0760*** 10.9930** 6.7660 8.9810 
 
Matched 1.3090 1.2890 5.2770 -0.4370 
NO_FARMS^2 Unmatched 1313.4000** 1447.1000 808.5000 - 
 
Matched -4.0000 112.7000 1133.6000 - 
CHG_AGLAND Unmatched 1.9400 1.8960 1.6910 -0.7390 
 
Matched 0.1360 -0.0520 -0.0840 0.1970 
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Table S2. Continued 
Variable Sample Full 
Resident& 
Retire Low Sales Commercial 
POP_DENSITY Unmatched -640.7300** -911.7300 -731.6200 -243.3100 
 
Matched -70.5700 -128.8100 -111.6900 -75.2900 
CHG_POPDEN Unmatched 8.9610*** 9.3450*** 14.1630*** 14.3950*** 
 
Matched -0.6320 0.1240 4.2850 0.2580 
DISTANCE Unmatched -0.7800 0.3410 -1.6720 0.7160 
 
Matched 0.0160 -0.0300 -0.8700 0.2620 
DISTANCE^2 Unmatched -71.2000 33.2000 - - 
 
Matched -8.2000 -6.8000 - - 
RESIDUAL_VALUE Unmatched 6.9270** 3.6840 14.0790 -4.2280 
 
Matched 1.5580 0.5440 7.7130 7.5510 
RESIDUAL_VALUE^2 Unmatched 1063.3000 -619.4000 - - 
 
Matched 629.8000 -7.8000 - - 
HOUSINGVAL Unmatched 1.0E+04 -1.0E+04 3.0E+04** 4.0E+04*** 
 
Matched 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 1.0E+04 1.0E+04 
HOUSINGVAL^2 Unmatched - -4.0E+09 1.5E+10** 1.3E+10*** 
 
Matched - 1.0E+09 9.0E+09 2.0E+09 
RETIREMENT Unmatched -0.0367* - - - 
 
Matched 0.0006 - - - 
RESIDENT/RETIRE Unmatched -0.1535*** -0.0967** - - 
 
Matched 0.0035 0.0018 - - 
LOWSALES Unmatched -0.0027 - - - 
 
Matched 0.0047 - - - 
HIGHSALES Unmatched 0.0532*** - - - 
 
Matched 0.0008 - - - 
LARGE Unmatched 0.0446*** - - -0.0527 
 
Matched -0.0004 - - -0.0080 
VERYLARGE Unmatched 0.1315*** - - 0.1099** 
 
Matched -0.0015 - - 0.0242 
NONFAMILY Unmatched 0.0040 - - - 
 
Matched -0.0096 - - - 
GATEWAY Unmatched 0.0086 0.0113 0.0207 -0.0276 
 
Matched -0.0166 -0.0045 0.0216 -0.0037 
GREATALTANTIC Unmatched 0.0046 -0.0162 - -0.0147 
 
Matched 0.0084 -0.0018 - 0.0054 
SHORE Unmatched 0.0104 0.0073 -0.0293 0.0631** 
 
Matched -0.0028 0.0004 0.0043 0.0108 
SKYLANDS Unmatched -0.0285 -0.0304 0.0776 0.1047** 
 
Matched 0.0144 0.0054 -0.0014 0.0110 
SOUTHSHORE Unmatched -0.0219 0.0013 - -0.0792** 
  Matched -0.0048 -0.0012 - -0.0081 
Note: Matching algorithm used for the balancing test in each sample is the one that provides the best 
matching quality (See Table S1). ***, **, * are significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
RETIREMENT, RESIDENT/RETIRE, LOWSALES, HIGHSALES, LARGE, VERYLARGE, and 
NONFAMILY are dummy variables capturing farm types according to the ERS typology. GATEWAY, 
GREATALTANTIC, SHORE, SKYLANDS, and SOUTHSHORE are fixed effect dummy variables 
capturing regions in New Jersey.   
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Detailed explanation of sensitivity analysis for Tables S3 and S4 
Each row of the first four columns of Table S3 contains parameters pij characterizing the 
distribution of the unobserved binary variable U. Controlling for the observable covariates X, the 
estimated Γ provides an indication of the “outcome effect” (Out. Eff.) of U (the effect of U on 
the profit per acre of unpreserved farms) and the estimated Λ measures the “selection effect” 
(Sel. Eff.) of U (the effect of U on the decision to participate in the PDR programs).  The first 
row shows the baseline ATT estimate obtained with no confounder.  The second row of each 
subgroup reveals the ATT estimate obtained with a neutral confounder, where Γ and Λ are equal 
to one.  The other rows of each subgroup of Table S3 report variations in the baseline estimate 
when the binary confounding factor U is calibrated to mimic different observable covariates.  
Overall, the baseline estimate changes only slightly, affirming that our simulated results are 
robust to unobserved factors. 
Since the above findings may be driven by the behavior of the covariates, we search for the 
characteristics of Us (i.e., “killer” confounding factors) that would have to exist to render the 
point estimate of the ATT close to zero.  We simulate the distribution of U associated with the 
values of d (the difference in the binary confounding factor U among unpreserved farms that did 
and did not have profit per acre above the mean value) and s (the difference in the binary 
confounding factor U between preserved and unpreserved farms) designed to drive down the 
estimate of ATT to zero. We find the baseline ATT to be robust.  For the highest values of the 
selection effect (s=0.5) and the outcome effect (d=0.5), the point estimate obtained when U is 
included in the matching set is still positive (Table S4).1   
 
1 As discussed in Nannicini (2007), the sensitivity conclusions should be drawn more in terms of 
the comparison of the point estimates than in terms of the significance of the simulated ATT.  
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Table S3. Sensitivity analysis of profitability outcome for small farm with low sales subsample: 
Effect of “calibrated” confounders 
  Fraction U=1 by          
 
Treatment/Outcome Out. Eff. Sel. Eff. ATT SE 
  p11 p10 p01 p00 (Γ) (Λ)     
No confounder 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - - 313 132 
Neutral confounder 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 328 212 
Confounder-like 
        
GENDER 0.87 0.67 0.77 0.48 4.10 3.21 277 212 
HEIR 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.10 0.71 1.07 320 215 
OFF FARM 0.44 1.00 0.45 0.51 0.79 1.08 330 212 
RENTAL_INC 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 272.51 7.35 318 216 
DIRECT_SALES 0.15 0.00 0.23 0.07 4.95 0.66 339 215 
Note: U is  a binary confounding factor. pij is the probability that U=1 defined by treatment and outcome status 
where i {0,1} indicates treatment status with i=1 as enrollment in the PDR program and j {0,1} indicates 
outcome status with j=1 if the value of the profitability outcome (profit per acre) is greater than its mean value. On 
the basis of these parameters, a value of U is imputed and the ATT is estimated by kernel matching with U in the set 
of matching variables. A gaussian kernel function is used;  its associated bandwidth is equal to 0.039. The process is 
repeated 500 times. “SE” is the standard error. Outcome effect (Γ) is the average estimated odds ratio of U in the 
logit model of Pr(Y=1|T=0, U, X) and selection effect (Λ) is the average estimated odds ratio of U in the logit model 
of Pr(T=1|U, X). “ATT” is the average of the simulated ATTs. In the ‘confounder-like’ rows, U has been calibrated 
to match the distribution of the corresponding covariate. 
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Table S4. Sensitivity analysis of profitability outcome for small farm with low sales subsample: 
Characterizing “killer” confounders 
  s=0.1 s=0.2 s=0.3 s=0.4 s=0.5 
 
Λ  Λ  Λ  Λ  Λ   
 
[1.34, 1.61] [2.22, 2.75] [3.92, 4.72] [8.81, 11.46] [42.37, 47.62] 
d=0.1 325 315 302 281 237 
Γ [1.57, 1.62] (212) (217) (223) (225) (243) 
d=0.2 313 301 268 242 181 
Γ [2.41 2.50] (218) (216) (209) (222) (246) 
d=0.3 307 280 245 193 128 
Γ [4.03, 4.10] (215) (212) (208) (208) (231) 
d=0.4 304 263 213 161 78 
Γ [6.89, 7.79] (213) (205) (202) (196) (212) 
d=0.5 304 249 189 118 22 
Γ [13.95, 17.81] (216) (203) (197) (187) (201) 
Note: We assume that Pr(U=1)=0.50 and that p11-p10=0. s =p1.-p0.captures the difference in the binary 
confounding factor U between farms that enrolled and did not enroll in the PDR program. d = p01 –p00 
captures the difference in the binary confounding factor U among unpreserved farms that did and did not 
have profit per acre higher than the mean. Standard errors are in parentheses.2  
 All ATTs are averaged over 500 iterations. Γ is the average estimated odds ratio of U in the logit model 
of Pr(Y=1|T=0, U, X) and Λ is the average estimated odds ratio of U in the logit model of Pr(T=1|U, X). 
The baseline estimate without the confounder is equal to $313. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
2 With different predetermined values of Pr(U=1) and p11=p10, we can still obtain similar results 
qualitatively.  
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1
 A PDR program imposes a negative easement on an enrolled property that "runs with the land" 
and prohibits non-agricultural development in perpetuity, or a specified period of time.  Unlike 
fee simple acquisition, whereby full interest of land is conveyed to a purchaser, PDR programs 
establish a non-possessory interest in land. 
2
 This test involves comparison of the characteristics of preserved and unpreserved farms before 
matching and evaluation of whether any significant differences in the characteristics of the two 
farm groups remain after matching.   
3
 Capital asset pricing theory predicts that the sale price of a preserved farm will be a function of 
only the present value of the net returns in an agricultural use, if the restrictions imposed on the 
farmland by the sale of development rights are fully capitalized into the farmland values (Lynch, 
Gray, and Geoghegan 2007).   
4
  These data contain some duplicative entries.  For example, a few dozen farms have acreage in 
two or more municipalities.  In such instances, acreage preserved in each municipality is 
recorded, resulting in multiple closing entries for each farm.  
5
 For example, assume a 300-acre farm that is enumerated in the Census comprises three 100-
acre tax lots.  Assume also that the farm owner chooses to preserve one tax lot (100 acres) in 
each of three separate years.  These will be reflected as three different preserved farms in the 
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SADC dataset, since the closings occurred separately.  In some instances, one SADC closing 
record matched perfectly with a respective Census record.  In others, there were multiple SADC 
closings that were combined to match a Census record. 
6
 To qualify for state funding for farmland preservation, a farm must be eligible for the state's 
differential agricultural assessment program, be located in an agricultural development area (an 
area deemed by a county agriculture development board as one in which farming is viable in the 
long-term), targeted for preservation in a county comprehensive farmland preservation plan, and 
exhibit development potential based on zoning and environmental conditions.  Additional 
eligibility criteria are as follows.  A farm 10 or less acres in size must earn $2,500 in annual sales 
and 75% of its area (or a minimum of 5 acres) must be tillable and comprise soils capable of 
supporting agricultural or horticultural production.   For a farm greater than 10 acres in size at 
least 75% of its area (or a minimum of 25 acres, whichever is less) must be tillable and comprise 
soils capable of supporting agricultural or horticultural production.  Due to data limitations, a 
simplified set of eligibility screening criteria were used in our study.  For farms 10 acres or less 
in size, a farm was deemed eligible if it sold at least $2,500 worth of farm products and was at 
least 75% tillable (or 5 acres were tillable, whichever is less). Farms that were at least 10 acres in 
size were considered eligible if at least 50% of the land (or 25 acres, whichever is less) was 
tillable. 
7
 The basic idea of the radius matching is to use not only the nearest neighbor within each caliper 
(propensity range), but all of the unpreserved farms within the caliper. A benefit of this 
approach is that it uses only as many unpreserved farms as are available within the 
caliper and therefore allows for usage of extra (fewer) units when good matches are 
(not) available (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). 
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8
 Kernel matching and local linear matching are nonparametric matching estimators that use 
weighted averages of (nearly) all farms in the unpreserved farm group to construct the 
counterfactual outcome. Thus, one major advantage of these approaches is the lower variance. 
9
  We also estimate kernel and local linear matching algorithms using the Epanechnikov kernel 
function and find slightly different results. 
10
 We trim any observations with a propensity score below 0.034 in the full sample, 0.027 in the 
residential/lifestyle and retirement farm subsample, 0.015 in the small family farm with low 
sales, and 0.077 in the commercial farm subsample.  
11
 The method simulates the binary variable U (“the confounder”) from the data, which is used as 
an additional matching variable to estimate the propensity score and the ATT.  A comparison of 
the estimates obtained with and without matching on this simulated variable demonstrates the 
extent to which the estimator is robust to the unobserved factors. 
12
  Roughly 84,016 acres of preserved land is associated with the "commercial" farms (average 
farm size in the subgroup is 661.54 acres * 127 farms).  This equates to 78% of the acreage 
summed across the three farm subgroups.  The respective sample acreages for residential 
lifestyle/retirement farms and low sales farms are 13,364 acres and 10,253 acres, respectively. 
13
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where presoldiV is the actual price of  
preserved farm sold at optimal date *2t . 
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